

A SPECIAL FORUM:

POST 9/11: TWENTY YEARS OF MULTILATERAL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION



OCTOBER 2021

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This Forum opens discussion and observations on Post 9/11: Twenty Years of Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Cooperation (October 2021). Since 9/11 two decades ago, the terrorism landscape continues to cast a worrisome arc of instability and violence over many countries and regions in the world. Mindful that past and current security concerns require effective multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, this Forum focused on the lessons of these experiences for future “best practices” response strategies. Topics discussed by the distinguished speakers include increased international alliances with like-minded nations through diplomacy and other relevant efforts as well as expanded efforts with international organizations to counter and respond to the evolving terrorist threat. Expanded partnerships with civil society leaders is also considered in the battle against terrorism.

Video of the full conference may be found here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZDM2tO4cwc&t=1s>

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“POST 9/11: TWENTY YEARS OF MULTILATERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION”

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I. PREFACE

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER AND PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR.

EDITORS

The resort of force and violence by state and non-state actors in the struggle for power within and among nations is as old as history itself. Both the strong and the weak have deployed modus operandi capabilities ranging from primitive to modern technologies with profound consequences to the security concerns to the global system.

It is not surprising therefore that two decades after 9/11, terrorism from above and below still continues to cast a worrisome arc of instability and political conflicts over many countries and regions of the world. The debate in democracies over the need to craft effective responses to domestic and international terrorism focuses inter alia on *realpolitik* coupled with moral and human rights considerations.

For instance, since 9/11 expanded state power in the United States, these have included policies such as “Global War on Terror”, “Overseas Contingency Operations”, and other strategic and tactical approaches authorizing the use of military force internally and externally. Additionally, the European Union developed key roadmaps and toolkits for combating terrorism and securing the national interests of member-states (e.g., prevent, pursue, prosecute, punish, persuade, and protect).

Most recently, the United Nations that began its annual General Assembly session in September 2021, has placed discussion items on its agenda regarding combating and eliminating terrorism as well as maintaining international peace and security.

Mindful of the past and current security concerns, effective multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation requires increased international alliances of like-minded nations through diplomacy and other measures in responding successfully to potential conventional and non-conventional terrorist threats in the remainder of the 21st Century.

In this context, the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS), the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (PIPS), the International Law Institute (ILI), and other academic partners organized the virtual academic Forum on “Post 9/11: Twenty Years of Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Cooperation” held on September 09, 2021.¹ The program of this event began with opening remarks by Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman of the International Law Institute) and Dr. Jennifer Buss (CEO, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies). The virtual Forum was moderated by Professor Yonah Alexander (Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies). Presentations and discussion were by Dr. Raffi Gregorian (Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General & Director, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism), Gen. (Ret.) Wesley Clark (Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander), Amb. (Ret.) Stuart Eizenstat (Former Senior Official with Three US Administrations and Ambassador to the European Union), Hon. Richard Prosen (Deputy Director, Office of Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State), and Distinguished University Professor Rita Colwell (University of Maryland, College Park; Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health). Closing remarks were delivered by Gen. (Ret.) Alfred Gray (29th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (1987-1991) and Chairman of the Board of Directors and Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies). This event is the latest Forum on inter-disciplinary health and security threats mounted within the academic framework of 2021 programs.

BIOLOGICAL THREATS: AN ACADEMIC CONTEXT

The national, regional, and global spectrum of biological challenges is limitless. The first critical threat is caused by mother nature’s infectious diseases. The second concern is man-made including terrorism. More specifically, COVID-19 alarmed the world in 2019 and 2020 because of similarities with the SARS (the respiratory syndrome) some 18 years ago, which killed almost 800 people. On March 11, 2020 the WHO declared the escalating biological threat a pandemic and two days later registered 8,710,703 COVID-19 cases, which had resulted in a total of 225,817 deaths. By September 09, 2021, the United States registered 40,458,930 COVID-19 cases resulting in a total of 652,699 deaths. During the same period, the pandemic confirmed 222,637,937 cases with a total death toll of 4,597,751 worldwide.²

Many questions have arisen during the pandemic ranging from the exact origin in China, to whether the worst is yet to come, to what are the best response practices to prevent the next potential outbreaks.

In view of the expanding biological threats that pose continual and unprecedented security challenges to the United States and abroad, we organized a total of six Zoom conferences in 2020: “Combating Global COVID-19: From Isolation to International Cooperation” (March 26, 2020); “Combating Global COVID-19: A Preliminary Assessment of Past Lessons and Future Outlook” (April 14, 2020); “Global COVID-19 and the Economy: Costs, Lessons, and Future Outlook” (May 20, 2020); “Global COVID-19 and

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZDM2tO4cwc&t=7225s>

² The statistical data is drawn from John Hopkin’s University global COVID-19 data, September 09, 2021.

Energy: Threats and Responses” (June 25, 2020); “COVID-19 and Sports: Threats and Responses” (July 30, 2020); and “A Lab of One’s Own: Fighting Bioterrorism, Cholera, and COVID-19” (November 17, 2020). The videos of the six Forums are accessible at the ILI website [www.ili.org].

Additionally, four printed publications drawn from the 2020 Events have already been released: Monograph on “Global COVID-19 and Sports: Exposure Claims and Liability Mitigation Considerations” (September 2020) and “Global COVID-19 and Sports: Threats and Responses” (October 2020)³; “Combating Global COVID-19: From Isolation to International Cooperation” (November 2020)⁴; “A Lab of One’s Own: Fighting Bioterrorism, Cholera, and COVID-19” (December 2020).⁵

Seven Zoom conferences were held thus far in 2021: “Combating Terrorism Amid Covid-19: Review Of 2020 And Outlook For 2021 And Beyond”(February 25, 2021)⁶; “Combating Biological Threats: A Legal Agenda For Future National And Global Strategies”(March 31, 2021)⁷; “Covid-19 and the Role of Communication”(April 29, 2021)⁸; “Covid-19 and the Role of Human Rights”(May 26, 2021)⁹; “Covid-19 and the Role of Technology”(June 29, 2021)¹⁰; “War or Peace in the Middle East: Quo Vadis?”(July 22, 2021)¹¹; and “Covid-19 and the Role of the Military”(August 23, 2021).¹²

Two reports have been printed in 2021: “Combating Terrorism Amid COVID-19: Review of 2020 and Future Outlook” (June 2021)¹³ as well as “Combating Biological Threats: A Legal Agenda For Future National And Global Strategies” (August 2021).¹⁴

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Professor Alexander wishes to express his deep appreciation for the decades-long academic partnership with the International Law Institute (ILI) and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (PIPS). He is most grateful to Professor Don Wallace, Jr., Robert Sargin, Emma Leigh Welch, Daniela Rodas, and Kelly Ho from ILI, as well as the PIPS leadership of Dr. Jennifer Buss (CEO), General Al Gray (USMC (Ret.), Chairman of the Board) and Gail Clifford (VP for Financial Management & CFO). Special thanks are due to both Professor John Norton Moore and Professor Robert Turner, (Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia) for their continued inspiration and support of our academic work for many years.

Also, the internship program of the International University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS), that is coordinated by Kevin Harrington, has provided research and administrative support for this publication. The IUCTS interns include: Victoria Airapetian (University of Maryland, College Park graduate), Sydney Betancourt (Stetson University, graduate), Sarah Butcher (Texas Tech University undergraduate), Matthew Dahan (the American University), Daan de Zwart (the University of Amsterdam graduate), Caleb Dixon (University of California, Berkeley), Emma Goldsby (University of Kentucky), Kaley Henyon (Mercyhurst University undergraduate), Stephen Mathews (Pennsylvania State University undergraduate), Matthew Phenenger (Ohio Wesleyan University graduate), Avgustina Peycheva (Moscow State Institute of International Relations, PhD), Rebecca Roth (Princeton University undergraduate), Maxim Ryabinin (Syracuse University), and Virag Turcsan (Erasmus Mundus Joint International Master’s degree).

³ <http://ili.org/about/news/1243-iucts-and-ili-host-ambassador-s-forum-global-covid-19-threats-and-responses.html>

⁴ https://potomacinstitute.org/images/ICTS/ICUTS_COVID%20Isolation%20and%20Cooperation%20Report.pdf

⁵ https://potomacinstitute.org/images/ICTS/ICUTS_Labof0nes0wn_RitaColwell_2020_F.pdf

⁶ <https://www.ili.org/about/news/1269-ili-hosts-combating-terrorism-amid-covid-19.html>.

⁷ <https://ili.org/about/news/1275-combating-biological-threats.html>

⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDXgaPGMOLs&t=4191s>

⁹ <https://www.dropbox.com/s/q9smt725d4fcial/cv19hr-05-26-2021.mp4?dl=0>

¹⁰ https://www.dropbox.com/s/v2fzbz13ndlhr8j/covid19andtechnology7_14%20-%20SD%20480p.mp4?dl=0

¹¹ <https://www.dropbox.com/s/lr8ptivii3i1hkv/IUCTS-July-22-2021.mp4?dl=0>

¹² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VEXYloOGwAk>

¹³ <https://www.ili.org/training/1269-ili-hosts-combating-terrorism-amid-covid-19.html>.

¹⁴ <https://ili.org/about/news/1275-combating-biological-threats.html>

II. SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS [DRAWN FROM THE FORUM'S PARTICIPANTS]

1. The last 20 years have been full of drastic changes in all our lives pertaining to the scope and scale of terrorism and anti-terror resolutions, especially taking into consideration the situation with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
2. A lot of progress has been achieved for the past 20 years within the field of counter terrorism.
3. As we grapple to understand the current situation in Afghanistan, we need to assess what we have learned and what we should be doing differently.
4. Terrorism trends began to change in the early 90s with the emergence of Al Qaeda, particularly after attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This marked a shift from calculated and targeted terrorism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s to the era of mass casualty attacks.
5. The Security Council has gone on to adopt a series of counterterrorism resolutions by consensus, finding unity on the issue of terrorism.
6. The General Assembly established the UN Office of Counterterrorism, which helps coordinate the UN system in its wide-ranging efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.
7. CTFP, the Global Program on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, and the Global Victims of Terrorism Support Program are notable programs.
8. We need to do better to tailor our efforts to the special needs and contexts of each country to ensure national ownership and sustainability of all efforts. When designing counterterrorism campaigns, we must think comprehensively about a country or region's culture, cyberspace, demographics, economy, history, language, religion, gender dynamics, and other factors.
9. The international community must achieve more than just tactical wins against terrorist networks, but rather play the long game; more needs to be done to help terrorist-affected countries build relevant high impact capacity to address the issues they face; we must make the most of multilateral mechanisms to fight terror.
10. The situation in Afghanistan requires the international community to further step up its work, which must be based on the understanding of cultural ethos and on-the-ground realities.
11. The U.S. is less vulnerable to terrorist strikes than it was before, at least not a 9/11 style terror attack.
12. We have created a complete set of defenses against terrorism. These defenses are technological, institutional, and international in scope.
13. Technologically, we have developed security cameras, airport screenings, watch lists, digital identification, and facial recognition. Institutionally, the Counterterrorism Center was set up. Internationally, NATO got more engaged.
14. The increasing ability of the U.S. and foreign governments to know what their citizens are doing moved the tradeoff between security and privacy consideration in the direction of security and away from privacy and individual liberties.
15. Technological developments such as social networks, crypto-currencies, and cyber, provide terrorists with a platform to recruit, privately communicate, raise funds, undermine the U.S. Dollar, and threaten strategic installations such as the electricity grid.
16. We are much more vulnerable to biological terrorism than we have been before.
17. In today's multi-polar era, we should not think that terrorism is exclusively the province of Islamist fundamentalists, rather, it is perhaps the malign design of a rival superpower such as Russia, which was directly or indirectly behind all the terrorist activity in the 1960s and 1970s.
18. It is critical that while the US withdraws from Afghanistan it does not intend to withdraw from all anti-terrorism battlefields around the world. The US requires the same long-term staying power as its adversaries.
19. One prime goal for the US is to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction that would heighten tensions with the US, its allies, as well as the rest of the world.
20. Second goal for the US should be to strengthen special military forces and CIA capabilities that can be deployed along with drone capabilities. This also includes the ramping up of on the ground recruitment by the intelligence community with the goals of monitoring and disturbing terrorist group activities.
21. The US needs to recognize that corruption is one of the biggest obstacles in the way for dealing with other governments. Improving auditing capabilities is vital so that the agencies can know exactly where the money is going.
22. Teaching the intelligence agencies, State Department, as well as the military the customs, history, and language of the countries the US is involved with. History has shown that US personnel lacked the language and culture skills to properly navigate the countries they were in (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq).

23. Sound decision making: Historically, the lack of valid intelligence has led the US to make poor decisions (i.e., Iraq's WMDs and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). This ties in with inadequate planning for what happens after military operations are over. The US must be seen as liberators rather than conquerors.
24. Distinguishing between three types of terrorist threats.
 - a. State sponsors of terror such as Iran
 - b. State sponsored heavens for terrorist groups such as Pakistan
 - c. Weak and fragile states which become home to terrorist groups such as Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001
25. Economic sanctions, when used properly, can yield favorable results. However, they must be multilateral in nature. Other solutions to counteracting state sponsors of terror are diplomacy and using the full resources of US trade and financial capacities.
26. Progress has been made against ISIS and Al-Qaeda, but continued focus should be directed toward threats in Africa and Southeast Asia.
27. Concerning the ISIS threat, the U.S. and NATO should focus on the threat of Foreign Trained Fighters traveling back to home countries to do harm.
28. Progress has been made on the legal front in the United States in charging and sentencing repatriated FTF's that have been captured and extradited to the United States.
29. State Department has been working with U.S. Department of Justice and NATO to use battle evidence in legal proceedings to prosecute crimes committed in conflict zones.
30. REMVE or Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism is a top priority for the current Presidential administration after the events of January 6.
31. Russia Imperial Movement has been designated as a global terrorist organization, first time the U.S. has designated a white supremacist organization as a terrorist organization.
32. U.S. joined "Christchurch" call to action fighting white supremacy
33. By enhancing multilateral information sharing and a new government approach, the U.S. and the world can work together to ensure a more peaceful future.
34. The Anthrax bioterrorist threat in the months following the September 11th attacks originated from a place of domestic threat, not internationally.
35. A committee was assembled to assess and counter the Anthrax threat, which comprised of representatives from 16 different government agencies.
36. Anthrax can be easily obtained in nature by anyone who has basic knowledge of the bacteria and microbiology and is a diverse enough substance that it can be delivered and spread in many differing ways.
37. DNA from an Anthrax sample was sequenced and compared to references. The reference strain that matched had been isolated from a domestic sample, which turned the investigation away from al-Qaeda.
38. There have been tremendous advancements in the last twenty years in terms of how bio-threats affect American society, how to quickly sequence bio-threats, and how to develop vaccines to counter it.
39. Over the last 20-30 years, we have lost the capability of our public health capacity; Dr. Colwell recommends rebuilding public health laboratories in each state.
40. Dr. Colwell also recommends changing federal law to allow for federal agencies to share data and work collaboratively, similar to what her committee accomplished during the Anthrax investigation in 2001.
41. The issue is the ability of clever actors to use social media to identify seams in society, accelerate them, and use them for recruitment.
42. The US needs to remain humble about its capability of imposing its systems on different societies. Introducing US-style democracy in a society such as Afghanistan which is very decentralized is not conducive to success. However, that does not mean the US should stop attempting to spread its values, it must simply adapt them to each society.
43. To combat terrorism in the future, the US will need to address both state sponsors of terror as well as terrorist groups themselves. Most of all figuring out a way to address the issue of Pakistan is of top priority. Furthermore, keeping an eye on the new Taliban government in Afghanistan will be critical.
44. Science has progressed to be able to identify in minutes what would have taken months or years to identify twenty years ago.
45. Anthrax is still possibly a bio-threat due to the lack of state funded public health laboratories; these labs are needed in order to protect Americans from future bioterrorist threats.

46. NATO under Obama and Trump administration focused on counterterrorism through supporting of Iraqi forces training and support of counter ISIS force. Possible NATO/Interpol partnership on counterterrorism training.
47. Terrorism is a tactic, but is it wise to declare war on a tactic?
48. There has to be a clear strategy in each country, internationally, big in large countries and small in small countries. This should be done through the UN, EU, and other international actors.
49. In the wake of 9/11, we were paying a lot more attention to the global terrorist challenge than we are doing today. We need to get more involved once again.
50. One of the strategies we adopted, was following the money. We need to go back to some of these tactics. People should be trained on anti-terrorist type activities, techniques and so on from the ground up.

III. OPENING REMARKS

PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR., Chairman of the International Law Institute

Welcome! Two days from now we will be celebrating the 20th anniversary of 9/11, 2001, which seems long ago. You know, we hear a lot today about the need to focus on China and Russia, which of course we must. But the war against terrorism continues. Yonah will be introducing a very distinguished panel, but before that I'm going to call on Dr Buss, but before that I just want to say hello to General Gray. Having done that, Jennifer, the floor is yours.

DR. JENNIFER BUSS, CEO, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Thank you so much for the opportunity to be here today. On behalf of the Potomac Institute, I would like to welcome our distinguished panelists and all of our attendees.

As we reflect on the events of 20 years ago, so many things have dramatically changed in the world and the way we've lived our lives for the last two decades. It is really sobering to take stock and look back on how things were then and compare them to now.

I don't want to start off on a negative tone; we have made a lot of progress as you will hear today. International terrorism has stayed abroad for the last twenty years, which is a definition of success to some. I do want to give General Gray an opportunity to welcome you on behalf of the Institute and I know that today will provide for a fruitful discussion.

IV. CONTRIBUTORS' PRESENTATIONS

This section of the Report consists of presentations made by the contributors at the Special Forum: "Post 9/11: Twenty Years of Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Cooperation" that was held on September 9th, 2021 via Zoom conferencing. Some updates and revisions were made by the invited participants.

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN,

Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General & Director, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism

Thank you, Professor, Generals, distinguished panelists, ladies, and gentlemen. I remember 9/11 in the way that many people remember the summer of 1939. It was one of the most beautiful days I can ever recall, and of course what happens later that day we all remember it in our own ways and probably have very clear, lasting memories of it. This Saturday marks the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The time for remembrance and tribute to the victims, survivors, first responders, and all those who fight for a world free of terrorism, but it is also a time for reflection about the international response to terrorism. As we grapple to understand what the current situation in Afghanistan means for our collective counterterrorism efforts, we need to assess what we have learned and what we should be doing differently.

To help put things in perspective, let me start with a brief, admittedly somewhat simplistic, overview of modern terrorism and how the United Nations has evolved over the last decades to address it. Let me rewind to the 60s and 70s for a moment. While the world had already seen primarily post-World War II insurgent groups use terrorist tactics as part of their campaigns, modern "terrorism" and "terrorists" were, in popular conception, generally associated those terms with small radical groups. With no social media to amplify their message, small groups of zealots struggled to gain the public attention they sought for their cause, or to gain leverage against governments and societies they opposed. However, being the golden age of television wire services, they could do something spectacular to grab the headlines like hijack or blow up a plane or take hostages or conduct brazen assassinations of government officials. Indiscriminate mass killing was rarely the point of such terrorism. Rather, it was the psychology of the act itself and the attention it gained that was the point, or more acute goals such as the release of prisoners.

Into the 1960s and 70s, many such terrorist acts were handled by national security forces and or those of a ruling colonial power. International responses, if any, were limited or marked by bilateral frictions between states in which terrorist attacks happen or who lost victims and those which may have harbored or provided support to the attackers. However truly international responses to terrorism began to emerge when such attacks started to target either people entitled to a special protection in a foreign state, so-called "internationally protected persons", or conveyances in activities that are regulated by international bodies such as transnational flights and, later, airports and ships. International responses of the period were typically prompted by some specific terrorist act or acts which attracted widespread condemnation and led to the adoption of international conventions or protocols. The first of these related to the prevention of hijacking of aircraft and use of explosives against aircraft but were soon followed by the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons and the even more specific 1979 Convention against the taking of hostages—both of which resonated with the horror of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre.

Where things really started to change in the early '90s was with the emergence of Al-Qaida from the insurgency against the Soviet-backed regime in the 1980s. In August 1998, the group used truck bombs and near-simultaneous destinations, in what would be an Al-Qaida signature in future attacks, against the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 244 and wounding nearly 4,500 more. This marked a serious shift from the more calculated and targeted terrorism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s into the era of mass casualty attacks in which the psychology of the act, indeed often the very purpose of an attack, was to kill and maim the largest number of people possible. The embassy bombings prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1267 the following year to create an international sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, who harbored the group in Afghanistan.

In terms of numbers, then, the mass atrocity of 9/11 that we commemorate this Saturday took nearly 3,000 lives in a little more than an hour and wounded and sickened many more from more than 90 countries. It was not only the biggest single terrorist attack, but it made clear that, despite whatever twisted philosophy laid behind it, mass casualties and sheer savagery have become the hallmark of 21st century terrorism, lead first by Al Qaeda and then its Da'esh offshoot. Even the United Nations itself became a target, starting with UN compounds in Baghdad in 2003, Algiers in 2007, Pakistan in 2009, Abuja in 2011, and more recently peacekeepers in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo just to name a few. Only a few days after the 9/11 attacks the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, obliging all Member States to criminalize terrorist activity, including financial support for the harboring of such activities. The Security Council then decided to form its Counter-Terrorism Committee, in part to help it assess Member States' compliance with Security Council resolutions with the support of an Executive Directorate, or CTED. By the way, the Council will hold a session to mark the 20th anniversary of 1373 this coming Monday.

The Security Council has since gone on to adopt a whole series of counter-terrorism resolutions by consensus, finding unity on the issue of terrorism even when it could not agree on how to address the conflicts in Syria and other places where Al-Qaida and Da'esh thrive. For example, Al-Qaida's known interests in weapons of mass destruction led the Council to adopt Resolution 1540 in 2004; it obliges all Member States to adopt legislation and other measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material. The Council created a group of experts and another committee to monitor its implementation.

The General Assembly was also spurred to action after 9/11, and as the fifth anniversary of the attacks approached in 2006, it adopted, by consensus of all Member States, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an important development considering Member States still cannot agree on a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and a definition thereof.

Member States themselves are primarily responsible for implementing the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, but the UN organization also has a role in helping provide technical assistance and capacity-building to states requesting help to implement its provisions on addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, combating terrorism, and upholding human rights and the rule of law. The Secretary-General created a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Taskforce (CTITF) to coordinate the work of relevant UN entities involved in implementing this strategy and other related resolutions.

Five years later, the General Assembly welcomed the establishment of the UN Counter-terrorism Centre (UNCCT), entrusted with promoting international counter-terrorism cooperation and to support Member States in implementing the GCTS. Established within the Department of Political Affairs along with the CTITF Office, UNCCT as it's called, was given foundational financial contributions from the government of Saudi Arabia, which over the past ten years has allowed the Centre to launch capacity building programs and funds.

Now in light of what has happened in Afghanistan—and I think it is worth mentioning just as a footnote here that also in 2011, after Osama bin Laden was killed, the Security Council decided to hive off the Taliban from the 1267 sanction regime, keeping the original one on Al-Qaida but adopting a separate one through Resolution 1988 for the Taliban, including provisions related for delisting sanctioned individuals who met certain criteria indicating a renunciation of violence and commitment to the political processes set forth in the 2010 Kabul conference. As have we seen though, a number of listed individuals now form part of the new Taliban cabinet.

Back to the Security Council in 2014, when we saw the adoption of Resolution 2178 in response to Da'esh's seizure of Mosul in an unprecedented foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon in which more than 40,000 fighters from nearly 100 countries travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Da'esh and other groups. This consensus chapter seven resolution obliges all Member States to criminalize offenses related to the preparation, travel, and other preparatory acts undertaken for the purpose of committing terrorist offenses. As Member States moved to implement its provisions, it contributed to staunching the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to the region.

But the phenomenon remains a massive problem even after the territorial defeat of the so-called Caliphate in March 2019, as thousands still remain in the region along with tens of thousands of associated family members, including many children who were born during the conflict and stranded in camps across northeastern Syria. The Council also adopted a number of other resolutions related to Da'esh as well, including 2199 on preventing the sale of looted antiquities and oil and 2396, which requires all Member States to adopt and use passenger data systems in combination with biometrics, and Interpol and other watch lists, to screen for known and suspected terrorists, especially relocating foreign terrorist fighters.

The UN also needed to adapt to the evolving methodologies of these groups. As an example, the extraordinary rise of global connectivity through social media platforms from the early 2010s onward saw a concurrent increase in sophistication and reach of terrorists' use of the internet for recruitment, particularly to reach otherwise marginalized communities while also glorifying their so-called successes. The emergence of such narratives in a large part contributed to efforts on the prevention of violent extremism, particularly the UN system-wide plan of action on the same addressing the role of social media on terrorist narratives, closely followed by the Security Council Resolution 2354 addressing the critical importance of counter narratives and the role of the media in preventing and countering violent extremism. Similarly, the Women Peace and Security Agenda, particularly UNSCR 2242, has addressed the evolving understanding of the terrorist threat by examining the gendered nature of terrorism and extremism while seeking to ensure the leadership and participation of women in national-level plans for the prevention of violent extremism.

By 2016 though, it was clear that Member States needed to implement UN provisions to counter Da'esh's social media-fueled global reach and the FTF phenomenon quickly exceeded the limits of UNCCT and CTITF as small parts of the Department of Political Affairs.

Incoming Secretary-General Guterres and Member States saw a need to lift UNCCT and CTITF out of DPA and place it into a separate dedicated entity within the UN Secretariat. And so, in 2017, the General Assembly agreed by consensus with the Secretary General's proposal to establish the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) headed by its own Under-Secretary-General.

UNOCT was established to bring strategic leadership and coherence to counter-terrorism policy. We help coordinate the United Nations system in its wide-ranging efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

Additionally, in December 2018, the Secretary-General set up the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact to replace the old CTITF. It is now the biggest coordination framework in the UN, including 43 UN and other entities and organizations such as Interpol and the World Customs Organization. Each entity brings its own expertise to various problem sets, and this allows us to coordinate activities across the United Nations' human rights, peace and security, and development pillars in a truly holistic way. Actors like the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Women, the UN Development Program, and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime all ensure a true "one-UN" approach to counter-terrorism aligned with the Secretary-General's vision.

For its own part, UNOCT has added to UNCCT's dynamic capacity-building work a portfolio of globally applied programs tailored for Member States' specific needs. We're almost entirely funded by voluntary contributions from donor states, principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also an increasing proportion comes from some thirty other donors including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, the European Union, and a number of Member States. Our Budapest-based counterterrorism travel program is a good example of one of our global programs.

Working with CTED, UNODC, ICAO, and UN Office of Information and Communications Technology, our Counter Terrorism Travel Program (CTTP) interviews human rights compliance with advanced technology with a multi-agency team that helps Member States comply with UNSCRs 2396 and 2482. These require states to use advance passenger information and passenger name recognition data in combination with biometrics and access to Interpol and other international and national watch lists. The program provides states the legislative assistance, technical training, and software needed to detect and predict the travel of known and suspected terrorists, and other serious criminals, in a way that still respects human rights with data and relative privacies. It represents the best example of a practical and effective multilateral response to a real terrorist threat that leverages Member States' sovereignty and territorial integrity while contributing to a network intended to defeat terrorist networks. It also demonstrates the strength of a cohesive, coordinated UN response.

Another example is our Global Program on Countering the Financing of Terrorism launched last year. Together with CTED and UNODC, we assist Member States to increase their national and regional capacities to counter the financing of terrorism in accordance with UNSCR 2462 and Financial Action Task Force recommendations. It includes new software being developed to help financial intelligence units deal with all sorts of terrorism financing, including on the dark web and with crypto-currencies.

A third signature program is our Global Victims of Terrorism Support Program. Promoting and protecting the voices and rights of victims of terrorism is a critical priority for us and our partners. We work closely with victims' associations around the world, of course, but we also have work with UNODC and the Inter-Parliamentary Union to develop model legal provisions states can use to implement General Assembly recommendations on protecting and upholding the rights of victims. On September 20th, we will have a joint event with the 9/11 Memorial and Museum to commemorate the victims from more than 90 countries who perished in the 2001 attacks, and next year we will hold the first-ever Global Congress for Victims of Terrorism to provide a platform for victims' voices, but also for governments to learn about their special needs and challenges.

Let me go back now to the "bigger picture". Have we been successful? Are we better off now than twenty years ago? Three weeks ago, I would have said that, globally, terrorist attacks and casualties are down compared to several years ago; although this is in no way meant to diminish the suffering that still goes on in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, nor does it ignore Da'esh metastasizing in Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Mozambique. Moreover, the post-9/11 trend of authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies using counter-terrorism laws and provisions to oppress political rivals and opponents has only increased during the pandemic. Such action is not only in violation of political and civil rights, but it also has sown the seeds for future conflict and, as some studies have shown, can be the tipping point that pushes somebody to adopt violence, including terrorism.

Today, however, any answer to the question is clearly overshadowed by the recent developments in Afghanistan. Not only do they have dire consequences for the safety, security, and freedom of the people of Afghanistan and have considerable concerns about the lives and livelihoods of women, but it may also result in terrorist attacks projected from or through Afghanistan. The terrorist threat that we have seen growing in conflict zones, particularly in Africa, may well only become more acute as they seek to emulate the Taliban's takeover. We also have to remain particular about the situation at the borders with Afghanistan's neighbors.

The situation in Afghanistan has made it tragically clear that we need to do better to tailor our efforts to the special needs and contexts of each country to ensure national ownership and sustainability of their efforts and our efforts. Like map overlays that are used to plan a military campaign, when Member States and their partners design counterterrorism campaigns, they must also think comprehensively of a country's cultural, cyberspace, demographics, economy, history, language, religion, gender dynamics, and other factors of their own forms of terrain which must be understood in order to maneuver effectively. We need to learn from the past and ensure that our efforts truly have a sustainable long-term, lasting impact.

Let me offer now just a few thoughts on what the next decade of multilateral counterterrorism should focus on. First, the international community must achieve more than just tactical wins against network terrorist archipelagoes that fester and grow in areas of chronic conflict. We must play the long game, with strategic responses towards durable political solutions. That is because while military action is often necessary against terrorist insurgencies or, as in the case of the French intervention in Mali, vital to stopping a terrorist takeover of a state, it has proven insufficient to the state defeating them. At best it can achieve tactical victories, or it can contain a problem for a certain length of time. International partner forces can help keep terrorists off balance in conflict zones like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, but they do not in themselves generate the sort of political will or popular allegiance that governments need to make a country inhospitable to terrorist insurgencies. We need to go beyond this approach then to resolve conflicts and address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism using all of the political developmental and humanitarian tools at our disposal, including peace building, in order to prevent violent extremism and terrorism.

With respect to military efforts, my personal opinion is that greater unity of effort is needed by international security forces that are helping host countries battle insurgencies. Both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin are cases in point. Despite numerous international, regional, and bilateral interventions and deployments, the situation has gotten worse—not better. Is it really the best thing to have so many forces operating separately from each other without any clear connection to a political strategy?

Second, more needs to be done to help terrorist-affected countries build relevant high impact capacity to address the issues they face. That is why we are starting to establish field-based program offices to deliver capacity-building assistance that are closer to the beneficiaries, so that it is more impactful and sustainable. One example is our innovative Behavioral Insights Hub in Doha, which is based on an advanced approach on prevention. Another example is our training center in Rabat, which will directly support requesting countries in Africa with the necessary level of specialization on counterterrorism. And that is why we are currently setting up a program office in Nairobi for East Africa for sustainable capacity-building support on border security management, for example.

Third and most important is that we must make the most of multilateral mechanisms to fight terror. Modern terrorists are learning and adaptive groups that exacerbate and exploit conflict and communal tensions. They are not only not constrained by borders, but they also use modern technology to reach global audiences wherever they want to. But whether they are physically or virtually crossing borders to send money, weapons, or messages from one country to another, that is precisely where sovereign Member States acting in concert can be most effective. As General McChrystal observed, it takes a network to defeat a network. That is why our programs are effective and play to a states' strengths with its own networks, but also why linking to bilateral, regional, and international networks. It is why international legal cooperation on things such as battlefield evidence gathered by anti-Da'esh coalition partners and shared through Interpol can be game changers if used properly and in concert.

I mentioned earlier the 7th review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The negotiations on this Strategy were delicate and sensitive political processes, as priorities from 193 Member States differ widely. This year was the most forward-looking review since the strategy was first adopted in 2006. It includes 53 new paragraphs addressing today's most pressing issues on terrorism and violent extremism.

For the first time the Strategy sets the ground to address the rise in terrorist attacks on the basis of quote xenophobia, racism, and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief. Yes, neo-Nazis and white supremacists are back. They have learned from Da'esh and have international linkages with multiple nodes. Reaching consensus on action against this will prove to be essential for the adaptability and credibility of international counterterrorism efforts.

With this resolution, the General Assembly also tackles the crucial need to counter the use of new technologies for terrorist purposes such as artificial intelligence, 3D printing, and drones, and the emerging use of new social media platforms including gaming technologies for recruitment. It makes a strong call for cooperative measures to stop the spread of terrorist content and hate speech online.

There is also the delicate situation of repatriation of children with links to foreign terrorist fighters stranded in camps in Iraq and Syria. It is now included on a case-by-case basis. The protection of human rights and the rule of law have always been key in the strategy, but this review has gone a step further with meaningful advances on human rights including gender equality, the rights of the child and victim, and humanitarian action. It also includes groundbreaking language to ensure compliance with human rights and the rule of law, and this is probably the most important lesson from twenty years of counterterrorism: the failure to protect and promote human rights, especially human rights abuses committed by security forces, give terrorists recruitment tools for free.

To conclude, the work of the United Nations is now more important than ever. As the terrorist threat has evolved, so have we—and we must continue to do so. The United Nations and its Member States need to speak and act with one strong, united voice and use all the tools at their disposal. The situation in Afghanistan requires the international community to further step up its work. Such work must be based on the understanding of cultural ethos and on-the-ground realities, the protection of innocent civilians and saving human lives must be our priority, and humanitarian access must be guaranteed. Thank you.

GENERAL (RET.) WESLEY CLARK,

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander

Good afternoon Yonah and distinguish panel.

Thanks for giving me the opportunity to make a couple of remarks here and introduction. It is 9/11 week and of course we are looking back and we are looking forward and it's natural to ask how far we've come and if we are working better together. The answer is of course yes. We are working better together. We've created a complete set of defenses against terrorism. They are technological, they are institutional, and they are international. So, on the technological side we got security cameras, airport screenings, we got watch lists, we got digital identification, we got facial recognition. We got institutions like the Counterterrorism Center set up. We got NATO more engaged. We are working better internationally with our allies. We've done a lot. This is not 2001. So, I don't think we are as vulnerable to a terrorist strike as we were then, at least not a 9/11 cell strike. It just wouldn't happen.

We moved a long way in terms of increasing the ability of governments, not only the United States but abroad, to know what their citizens are doing. In other words, if there is a tradeoff between security and privacy, we moved it considerably in the direction of security and away from privacy and individual liberties which has its own dangers obviously. But we are stronger. But there are some things that are cutting against us. Social networking provided a great opportunity for terrorists to recruit and also communicate privately. Crypto currencies are a great opportunity for funding and the continuing struggle against the American dollar and the power of the U.S. treasury adds to that. What we know from our work in biology is that we are much more vulnerable to biological terrorism than we've been before. It's not just COVID, it's the ability to manufacture an agent that could rip through the societies with much greater lethality that what we have seen from COVID. It might not be as widespread, but it might have a 50% mortality rate on it, and it would have to affect a small portion. That work, you can be sure, is going on against us right now. And there is the whole realm of cyber threats. So, we know that ransom-ware is out there. We know that our electricity grids are under attack, but it can be done by terrorists.

Now, here is the thing that is different and most disturbing for me. In 2001, we were the sole superpower. Russia was struggling, China was a pigmy. Today, China is a behemoth and Russia is a nuclear modernized disruptive power in world affairs. Just remember, it was Russia that started the old terrorism movement a century ago. Vladimir Lenin put it together. He built Comintern and if you look at the 1960s and 1970s in the Middle East and in Europe it was Russia directly or indirectly behind all that terrorist activity. So we can't think that today in a multi-polar era that terrorism is exclusively the province of Islamist fundamentalists from these ungoverned regions. It may be state sponsored working through them.

So as you do the discussions in the panel today, I hope you take advantage of this moment to think about the geo-strategic context. Yes, we still have to defend against terrorists. But we also have to be more mindful than ever of the source of terrorism. Not just a religion. Not just fundamentalists. But perhaps the malign design of a rival superpower. So, it's a new and challenging era. We have to evolve with it to keep Americans and Western civilization alive and safe

Thank you Yonah for the opportunity to introduce the panel, thank you.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) STUART EIZENSTAT,

Former Senior Official with Three US Administrations and Ambassador to the European Union

Thank you very much, Yonah. It's a privilege to be with this distinguished panel. There's clearly been success over the last twenty years in dealing with the threat of terrorism. It comes from a global, radical, Islamic movement. It does not have a central headquarters, but from desperate terrorist groups that share a common anti-western theology and feed on each other's success from the Middle East to Africa and Asia. There has been no repeat of anything like 9/11 to our own homeland or that of our allies, but there are continuing threats.

With the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rhetoric in the United States on both the right and the left of ending what are called 'forever wars'. there is a real risk of thinking that terrorist threats are behind us, and we can go back to business as usual. It is critical that we do not go from one end of the spectrum of major military interventions, which have often been without understanding the countries or cultures in which we intervene, and without matching realistic policy to military force, to the other extreme of withdrawing from the anti-terrorism battlefield.

We need the same long-term staying power as our adversaries. This requires bipartisan support, so our policy doesn't change with each election, and the constant support of our allies in an anti-terrorism coalition with a long-term staying power. And may I just say that I was really inspired by Raffi Gregorian that the UN is in this for the long term. But for the U.S. the Taliban knew they could wait us out, the slogan you have the watch we have the time. For example, President Obama contributed to the surge of troops in 2009 but simultaneously set a public 2011 withdrawal deadline. What signal did that send? President Trump was rapidly drawing down troops and setting a May 1, 2021, for withdrawal while negotiating with the Taliban behind the backs of our Afghan allies. President Biden extended the deadline but again set an arbitrary August 31 deadline which took the backbone out of the Afghan army.

We should focus on some of the following broad goals with our allies, and with the support of Congress, the UN, and the American people. One prime goal is to prevent localized terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction that would dramatically escalate the threat to the United States, our allies, and indeed the world.

Another is to strengthen our special military forces and CIA capabilities that can be deployed along with drone capabilities, and recruitment of agents on the ground to monitor and disrupt terrorist groups. So, we don't think our only option is to have a hundred-thousand-person military force.

Third, it is imperative we develop our own over the horizon capabilities that in some way compensate, in part, for the loss of our military presence on the ground. These include cyber disruptions and wherever possible military bases to launch drone surveillance and attacks, if necessary.

Moreover, we must recognize that corruption is one of the greatest barriers to our success in dealing with governments threatened by terrorist groups. Only a fraction of the hundreds of billions of dollars we invested in Afghanistan got to the intended beneficiaries. I've interviewed for a book I'm working on the art of diplomacy, several people doing wonderful work with NGOs but who couldn't scale it up, and had to shut down in 2014 with the deterioration of the security in Afghanistan. We should greatly improve our auditing capabilities so we can understand exactly where our taxpayer's money is going and that it's going to their intended beneficiaries.

We often also don't understand the cultures, the history, or the language of the nations in which we intervene to combat terrorist threats. Therefore, the State and Defense Departments and our intelligence agencies should urgently build up the capabilities of our foreign service officers, our soldiers, and our intelligence agents to become more proficient in Arabic and Farsi and in the histories and political dynamics of key countries. While there have been great strides in multilateral cooperation, as described by Raffi Gregorian, this is not always translated into as much success as we might have suspected. And one of the reasons I believe is the problem of inadequate intelligence, which I'll get to in a minute.

Permit me to distinguish between different terrorist threats. One is state sponsorship of terrorist groups. Iran is the greatest state sponsor of terrorist groups Hezbollah, Hamas, and its direct involvement through its own Quds Force in Syria.

Second, are state supported havens for terrorist groups, Pakistan being a clear example. Despite our seeming leverage with our large arms and aid programs we could never put enough pressure on Pakistan through its own ISI intelligence group to stop it supporting the Taliban. That really would greatly impede our military action.

Third, are weak or failed states which become sites for terrorist groups. This was the case with Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001 and now, as Raffi Gregorian has stated, in the post August 31 Afghanistan, with the Taliban regime, which we drove out after 9/11, and which remains allied with Al-Qaeda that planned the 9/11 attacks. And if its interim cabinet is to be taken seriously as the permanent cabinet, Afghanistan will become a potential breeding ground for terrorist, ground zero. Syria's civil war is another example of a weak state which has become a site for terrorist groups.

Fourth are terrorist groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda which are significantly self-sustaining. And here I get to intelligence for sound decision making. With my personal experience with President Carter, it became very difficult for him to make sound decisions on Iran. The intelligence on the state of the Shah was very poor, we didn't realize he lost support of major elements of society. We didn't even know he had life threatening cancer, affecting his decision making. Nor did we have a clear understanding of his military leaders until General Heizer's mission. We were surprised at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I was present at Dover Air Force base with Secretary Albright when the bodies of those killed in our embassies in Tanzania and Kenya came back. Our response there I have to say frankly was not up to what it should have been, nor was our intelligence of the threat level. Iraq is another example of inadequate intelligence, with supposed weapons of mass destruction. For the book I'm working on I've interviewed scores of people, there was unanimity this was not just a Rumsfeld- Cheney creation. There was unanimity of all the major intelligence agencies, in Germany, in France, in the UK, in the US that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. What none of them realized was that he had destroyed them all but would not admit it due to his fear of Iran and being perceived as weak in his own country. And here the UN inspectors of course were not allowed to continue their work. Most recently with President Biden, while I frankly disagree with his decision to pull out the three thousand troops, I think we wouldn't have won the war with them, but we could have prevented a total collapse of the Army and the government. But in his defense the intelligence agencies seemed to have agreed that the Afghan army would have lasted many weeks, maybe even months and this led to inadequate planning for the withdrawal. We often intervene without understanding the nature of the countries. In Iraq for example, we did not appreciate what it would mean to remove a Sunni leader in a majority Shi'a country. With Afghanistan the 2001 Bonn agreement negotiated expertly by my predecessor Jim Dobbins as US ambassador to the EU, tried to create a western style democracy for a decentralized tribal society and an Afghan army in our own image as a top-down, technology-driven military.

The policy options are as follows. First is diplomacy. We need to have allied and UN cooperation against state actors. Diplomacy can be combined with positive incentives using the full resources of our trade and financial capacities including USAID, the IMF and World Bank and the regional development banks.

Next, are economic sanctions, using the power of the U.S. dollar, and financial and trade sanctions. I called myself the "sanctions-meister" of the Clinton Administration. Economic sanctions are effective generally only against state actors, and to be effective they have to be multilateral including those of our allies, and wherever possible the support of the UN Security Council. They were very effective over time with apartheid in South Africa; in 2003 with Libya helped force Gaddafi to give up his nuclear program; and, in the Balkans they were helpful in Bosnia and Kosovo. With Iran, EU sanctions helped lead to the November 2004 E-3 agreement; one of the great tragedies is that the Bush Administration did not embrace that agreement at a time when Iran's nuclear program was not as advanced as it is now. When the EU joined our unilateral sanctions in the run-up to the JCPOA in 2015, with sanctions on oil imports, on the Iranian central bank, on SWIFT clearances, this is what got Iran to the negotiating table in 2015.

Next, are covert actions. These are harder to do against non-state terrorists. We need more human resources on the ground. This was clearly a factor in Israel's efforts to disrupt Iran's nuclear program through assassination of the head of their nuclear effort and blowing up some of their key facilities, as well as the Stuxnet joint efforts presumably by the US and Israel against Iran's centrifuges.

With military options for state actors, we must be very discerning to clearly define when our national interest is impacted; and then we need to match political goals with military action. We often do not plan before military actions what will happen after them. If we contrast the Iraq war 2003 with the Gulf war in 1991, it was very evident that there were limited political objectives in the Iraq war, along with UN security council resolutions, Congressional support, and some 30 countries who joined, along with a limited political objective—to get Saddam out of Kuwait. Indeed, George HW Bush was criticized: 'you have Gaddafi by the neck, why don't you choke him?'. And the Bush administration replied 'that would break the UN mandate, but it also means we would own Baghdad' which are lessons completely forgotten in 2003. At the same time, ironically, President Biden decided to pull all our troops out of Afghanistan and decided wisely to keep three thousand in Iraq and that will help, I think, stabilize Iraq.

We've had other examples of military actions such as the Israeli attack in 1981 against the reactors in Iraq but again, if you look at the Libya situation this is a perfect example of not thinking through the consequences. Yes, we got rid of Gaddafi, but we unleashed terrorist groups in the vacuum that created. We did not have a plan in advance, what would it mean when the symbol, as awful as he may be, of statehood is removed. We simply don't make those kinds of calculations. We also have to know when we do military actions, major military actions, there will be civilian casualties with drone and airplane attacks. And we have to avoid trying to be seen as occupiers rather than liberators.

We also need non corrupt states to fight terrorists. We need to do more to fight corruption. Because corruption is in fact the enemy of our efforts. With respect to non-state terrorist groups, we need special forces, we need the CIA, but we have to realize that in places like Gaza with Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, terrorist groups often embed themselves with civilians making air attacks more difficult.

And last is nation building. Here again we should not go from pillar to post; it should not be written off if it is accompanied by security and anti-corruption measures to give it a chance to work. The people of Afghanistan indeed benefitted from nation building in terms of increased GDP per capita, education levels, women's entrepreneurship, and some semblance of governance. And one last point, up to two weeks before our withdrawal the Taliban had not captured one major city and kept it. So we need a smart strategy; we need a coordinated strategy. And it is very important to distinguish between the different scenarios I have discussed, including states like Iran which actively support terrorism. Thank you very much.

HON. RICHARD PROSEN,

Deputy Director, Office of Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State

First, a heartfelt thank you to Professor Alexander for the invitation to join this discussion today. Before I begin, please note that my remarks are off-the-record and the opinions and points expressed today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the United States government, the U.S. Department of State, or the Bureau of Counterterrorism. Thank you for the opportunity to gather today to discuss our multilateral efforts to address global terrorism-related threats and challenges. I serve in the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for Counterterrorism, where I am responsible for helping to coordinate our multilateral counterterrorism engagement across the world. I'm pleased to be here, together with my fellow speakers – critical partners in our collective efforts to fight terrorism and prevent violent extremism.

Under the Biden-Harris Administration, the United States is committed to multilateral engagement and working closely with multilateral organizations. Multilateral cooperation is the preferred and most effective method to address conflict, coordinate humanitarian responses, recognize and defend human rights, and prevent and confront terrorism while striving to build equitable systems of participation worldwide. Today, I'll discuss my personal views in how the terrorist threat is evolving, share thoughts on progress made, and outline plans regarding how to best address this global challenge going forward.

TERRORISM LANDSCAPE

We have collectively made progress countering al-Qa'ida and ISIS activities and dismantling their networks, exemplified by the success in defeating ISIS's so-called "caliphate" in 2019. On June 28, the 83 members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, including NATO, INTERPOL, and other international organizations, declared their joint determination to eliminate this global threat and pledged to strengthen cooperation to ensure that ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and its networks around the world, are unable to reconstitute any territorial enclave or continue to threaten our homelands, people, and interests. However, the ISIS and al-Qa'ida threats continue to metastasize and evolve – with the growing ISIS threat in Africa and al-Qa'ida's continued operations in Central Asia or through its proxies in East Africa and Southeast Asia. We must remain vigilant: our sustained focus on these groups is needed to further disrupt recruitment and plotting.

COLLECTIVE & UNIFIED RESPONSE

We must also continue our collective efforts to prevent ISIS's resurgence and mitigate the threat posed by the thousands of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their associated family members, who are detained in detention centers and displaced persons camps. To date, the United States has repatriated 12 adult U.S. citizens and 16 U.S. citizen minors from Syria and Iraq. The United States also took custody of the two remaining "Beatles" in late 2020 and charged the British citizens for their crimes against U.S. citizens in the Syria/Iraq region. Alexandria Kotey pled guilty to all eight counts in his indictment last week and faces life in prison without the possibility of parole when he receives his sentence in March 2022. He was involved in the kidnapping and murder of American journalists and aid workers – including James Foley, Steven Sotloff, Peter Kassig, and Kayla Mueller – as well as British and Japanese nationals. El Shafee Elsheikh's case is pending in the Southern District of New York (SDNY). We commend all countries which have repatriated their citizens, including Albania, Finland, Germany, Italy, and North Macedonia, and strongly encourage other countries to repatriate their citizens immediately. We support the United Nation's new Global Framework to aid the reintegration of individuals repatriated from Iraq and Syria and encourage others to do so as well. We've focused intensively on building our partners' civilian counterterrorism capacities, particularly in employing "law enforcement finishes," such as investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating terrorists.

The State Department has also been working – together with the Departments of Defense and Justice – to build capacity to collect and use battlefield evidence in civilian criminal justice proceedings to increase the effectiveness of prosecutions. NATO, the United Nations, Council of Europe, INTERPOL, and the European Union are all developing new guidelines and standard operating procedures to optimize the use of battlefield evidence in criminal proceedings. This capacity building has been critical in ensuring that FTFs do not escape accountability for crimes committed in conflict zones. These tools have grown increasingly important as the terrorism threat grows more decentralized and moves away from traditional military conflict zones, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. We've seen the real-world impact of these efforts in the Philippines, Bangladesh, Mali, Kenya, and Tunisia, *inter alia*, with our partners preventing terrorist attacks before they take place, responding to terrorist incidents more quickly and effectively, and holding terrorists to account while respecting the rule of law.

Let me offer a few words on the current situation in Afghanistan. The scenes of families agonizing over an uncertain future is heart wrenching for many of us who have worked over the years to improve the lives of Afghans, especially women and children. The United States government (USG) has made clear to the Taliban that they will be held accountable if they fail to uphold their core commitments and responsibilities: 1) continued movement out of Afghanistan of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to depart; 2) full adherence to counterterrorism commitments; 3) humanitarian access; 4) respect for the human rights of all Afghans, including women and girls; and 5) a peaceful transfer of power to an inclusive government with broad support. It is equally vital for the Taliban to hear a united message from the world that it must respect human rights and deny safe haven to terrorists.

The United States has also been working hard to counter and prevent terrorist travel, including in the development and adoption of UNSCR 2396 in late 2017, which imposed a range of new obligations on governments in response to the phenomenon of FTFs traveling to and from conflict zones. We have been and remain focused on ensuring that this landmark resolution is effectively implemented, including through championing strong ICAO international Standards and Recommended Practices, leading Global Counterterrorism Forum initiatives to develop watchlisting enterprises that are in accordance with each country's international law obligations, including international human rights law, as applicable, and prevent terrorist travel in the maritime domain, and providing direct capacity building to fund INTERPOL I-24/7 connectivity for many frontline states. I would also highlight that the United States is pleased to work with NATO on a whole-of-government project to build counterterrorism law enforcement capacity of NATO Partner nations. These combined approaches are essential to identify and address new and evolving threats.

ADDRESSING REMVE CHALLENGES

Confronting the terrorist threat posed by what the U.S. government refers to as racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist, or "REMVE" actors, is another top priority for the U.S. Administration and will remain so in the years ahead. The January 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol and the tragic deaths and destruction that occurred underscored what we have long

known: the rise of REMVE, including the associated violent radicalization of white supremacist groups, is a serious and growing national security threat. U.S.-based REMVE actors have also been known to communicate with and travel abroad to engage in-person with foreign REMVE actors, primarily in Europe and in countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. The USG is adapting its existing tools and authorities to address this transnational threat. On June 15, the United States released the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. While the focus of this strategy is on the domestic REMVE threat in the United States, there is also a focus on the transnational linkages – especially the online connections – between violent extremists in the United States and REMVE actors around the world.

Illustrating how seriously the USG takes REMVE as a counterterrorism issue, in 2020 the State Department designated the Russian Imperial Movement (or RIM) and three of its leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists – the first time the United States sanctioned a white supremacist organization. RIM is a white supremacist group based in St. Petersburg that trained individuals to commit terrorist acts. After the RIM designation, we engaged U.S.-based technology companies, which subsequently chose to voluntarily remove RIM accounts and content from their platforms. A RIM leader recently told an American journalist that one of the most devastating impacts of the designation was that Facebook shut down its webpage, which resulted in the loss of years' worth of information and hampered the group's reach.

Through multilateral efforts led by the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Aqaba Process led by Jordan, and regional organizations such as the OSCE, we are also leveraging our respective tools and capabilities against REMVE challenges. We supported the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law's Criminal Justice Practitioner's Guide on Addressing REMVE, which includes good practices on the types of counterterrorism tools and legislation that countries should consider to effectively counter REMVE. We also note that the United States has joined the Christchurch Call to Action, pledging with other member governments and technology partners to work together, while upholding the freedoms and protections of speech and association afforded by the U.S. Constitution, as well as reasonable expectations of privacy. Continuing to engage the technology sector to enhance information sharing and identify and counter often vague or coded language and symbols in terrorist and violent extremist propaganda and messaging is also vitally important.

CONCLUSION

By enhancing multilateral engagement, information sharing, and promoting a whole-of government approach, we can collectively and effectively work together to confront these challenges to ensure a more stable and peaceful future.

DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR RITA COLWELL,

University of Maryland, College Park; Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health; and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Thank you, Yonah, for the kind introduction. It's an honor to participate in the panel. Remembering 9/11- where we were when it happened - I was in my office at the National Science Foundation, on the twelfth floor of the NSF building about ten minutes from the Pentagon, in Arlington, Virginia. I was in a conference with White House staff to discuss the budget for the National Science Foundation. At approximately 8:45 a.m. the discussion was interrupted by my assistant, who entered the room to tell us that a plane had crashed into a tower in New York. I turned on the TV just at the time the second plane crashed into the Twin Towers.

There was no communication with the White House for the next two hours that morning. It wasn't until 11:30 am that we were able, I and the two White House staffers in my office, to communicate with the White House.

There are a few other memorable events that occurred at the NSF that day I'd like to share with you. I was the first woman Director of the National Science Foundation, but more importantly, the first microbiologist to serve as Director of NSF. There had been a biophysicist director, William McElroy, some years earlier, but directors of the NSF traditionally had been (and still are) physicists, engineers, and predominantly from the "hard sciences".

As General Clark emphasized, we continue to face serious bioterrorism threats of the home-grown variety. I'd like to share with you just such an attack that occurred following the Twin Tower destruction in 2001, namely the Anthrax bioterrorist attack. It was carried out such that it exemplified a "garden grown" variety of bioterrorism. The perpetrator was not al-Qaeda, as was believed initially. At the time the first victim was confirmed to be anthrax, I happened to be attending a committee at the CIA to discuss the potential of bio-threats. Shortly thereafter, Tony Fauci and I - without going into details, which are provided in my book (Colwell, 2020) – agreed that I would serve as Chair of an inter-agency coordinating committee on the anthrax bioterrorism (National Interagency Genome Science Coordinating Committee - NIGSCC). The NIGSCC served as advisory to the government agencies investigating the Anthrax attack.

One lesson is to note that the NIGSCC comprised representatives of ca. sixteen agencies, including NIH, NSF, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies. The committee worked as a team for three years, meeting every Friday afternoon with FBI and CIA agents assigned to the anthrax investigation. We were a coordinating group of agency representatives, neither elected nor officially appointed. It was decided that, although we could have had a

Presidential directive, we chose to work as a team of colleagues, representing our respective agencies and to focus on advising the CIA and the FBI on the Anthrax attack.

Anthrax is caused by a bacterium that can be isolated from soil, perhaps almost in any backyard. A person minimally trained in microbiology, perhaps at the high school level, can prepare a culture of Anthrax (Figure 1). Illness associated with the infection characteristically depends on how the spores enter the body of the victim (Figure 2). All types of Anthrax can cause death if not treated quickly and appropriately. The symptoms of Anthrax include cellulitis, if skin infection, or gastrointestinal anthrax if meat from an animal infected with anthrax is not properly cooked. Also, cases of anthrax have occurred by injecting drugs using a contaminated needle. Inhalation of anthrax spores, the dormant stage of anthrax found in soil or on an infected animal most often will be fatal.

Why emphasize anthrax? Because it is easily isolated from the natural environment and can be a powerful weapon since it can be released surreptitiously and can be released as a powder, spray, or aerosol, and can be delivered by airplane, thereby inactivating an entire city. And accomplished without detection by odor or taste. It's an effective agent.

The anthrax drama of 2001 occurred with letters containing anthrax spores being mailed on September 18th. By October, almost a month later, a reporter had died in Florida from inhalation of anthrax spores in a letter mailed to him. A few days later, anthrax spores were detected in the offices of American Media, Florida, where the reporter worked. By this time the FBI was actively investigating the incident. By October 9th, additional anthrax letters had been mailed. By the 12th of October, fourteen people had been infected and three died from inhalation anthrax, in New York, Washington, and New Jersey. In November, a victim -another innocent victim- became the fifth to die from inhalation anthrax, a woman who posted a letter in a postal box in New Jersey that had been contaminated by one of the earlier posted letters containing anthrax powder.

During this period of time, the terror of Anthrax was widespread in the United States. From the anthrax culture obtained from the spinal fluid of Mr. Stevens, the first victim, DNA was extracted, sequenced, and matched with genome sequences of all known reference *Bacillus anthracis*. Because the perpetrator, at first was believed to be al-Qaeda, the CIA prepared to collect soil samples from various countries around the world, a monumental task. However, the genome sequence of an ancestral strain of *Bacillus anthracis* that had been isolated in the United States years earlier proved to be nearly identical to the sequence of the attacks strain. Thus, attention immediately turned to the attack as a local bioterrorism incident.

The reference ancestor strain had been isolated from a dead cow in Texas in 1981. It was mailed in a container labeled "Ames", but it wasn't from Ames, Iowa, hence accidental naming as Ames strain. It must be noted that this was 2001, when the genome sequencing revolution was in its infancy, when less than half the full genome sequence of *Bacillus anthracis* had been determined and the genomes of only a few other bacterial sequences had been determined.

The coordinating committee which I chaired began its work. We were able to fund the genome sequencing through the agencies we represented, the unofficial yet fully functional National Interagency Genome Sciences Coordinating Committee (NIGSCC). Funds were made available to the CDC to sequence every smallpox strain extant. Through auspices of the NIGSCC the anthrax reference strains and strains sent through the mail were sequenced. The sequence of events is shown in Fig. 3.

The source of the anthrax, based on the genomic evidence was concluded to be from a laboratory at Fort Detrick, MD.

Different colony types, morphotypes from cultured spore preparations proved key in the investigation. It linked the anthrax attacks in New York and Washington. I hypothesize that the perpetrator, not being a genomicist very likely believed he would never be identified because petri dish cultures as evidence would not be convincing in a court of law. However, the NIGSCC was able to facilitate sequencing of the DNA of *Bacillus anthracis* isolated from powder in the anthrax letters, where it was determined that mutations were identical to samples from Dr. Ivins' laboratory at Fort Detrick. Details will never be known because Dr. Ivins committed suicide when arrested by the FBI. This work continued for another three years before a report was released by the FBI but it now is history. Scott Decker, who led the FBI investigation, and I have been interviewed and a podcast with details of the Anthrax investigation will be released.

Lessons learn from this "home grown bioterrorist event" are that in a highly polarized society, as General Clark described in this panel discussion, the potential of a bioterrorist attack within the US cannot be discounted. So, what have we learned from the Anthrax attack? First, tremendous advancements have been made in genomics and bioinformatics in the twenty years since that attack. And we have learned all too well the potential of a biothreat. The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States began early in 2020. Since January, 2020, the sequences of hundreds of virus strains have been sequenced and the benefit of twenty years' research on messenger RNA vaccines has been achieved. Rapid allocation of funding to pharmaceutical companies to produce vaccine and its subsequent distribution clearly demonstrate the value of biomedical research. We owe much to those scientists who proved the potential of messenger RNA vaccines. Warp speed production and distribution of effective vaccines protect us.

A very important lesson is that we have, as a nation, lost the capability of our public health system over the last several decades due to inadequate funding. We must rebuild the public health laboratory system, state by state. Our public health system desperately needs modernization and expansion. And in a report issued by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Colwell and Machlis)¹⁵, it is strongly recommended that interdisciplinary coordination of science agencies is a critical need. The Governor of each State in the U.S. should appoint a chief scientist. This would make it possible to coordinate and, during natural disasters, collaborate. It is imperative, also, that federal law be changed to allow federal agencies to share data and to work together, as was done by NIGSCC during the Anthrax bioterrorism. The Federal Agency representatives on the NIGSCC worked collaboratively and effectively to advise the FBI and CIA on the science used to track the source of the Anthrax. We must be able to coordinate, collaborate, and rebuild local, state, and national public health capacity. There will be another pandemic or perhaps within the US another anthrax like bioterrorism threat. We must be prepared as a nation. This is the most powerful of the lessons learned by the Anthrax bioterrorism and by COVID-19.



Figure 1. *Bacillus anthracis*, causative agent grown in laboratory culture.

Rasko, et. al., 2011. *Bacillus anthracis* comparative genome analysis in support of the Amerithrax investigation. Proc Nat Acad Sci DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1016657108




Figure 2. All types of anthrax can cause death if not treated with antibiotics. <https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/index.html>

The Anthrax drama as it unfolded




Figure 3. The Anthrax drama as it unfolded. Courtesy J. Ravel,

¹⁵Rita R. Colwell, Gary E. Machlis (2019). Science During Crisis: Best Practices, Research Needs, and Policy Priorities. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. ISBN: 0-87724-124-4.

<https://www.amacad.org/publication/science-during-crisis/section/2>

V. QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, DISCUSSION

Selected comments by the contributors to this report during the discussion following the presentations. Some of the invited attendees from the United States and internationally participated during this segment.

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER

If I may, I would like to ask Raffi a question that you refer to, the social media issue. As all of us know from our studies that terrorists are not born. They are created by certain sociological, political conditioning processes. My question to you is, under the debate that has going on for many years, and particularly even now, whether society at this stage is involved in a clash of civilizations, or whether it is a question of the battle of ideas including education?

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN

Well, first of all, I do not know if I would categorize it as a clash of civilizations. If that was the case, we'd see a lot more conflict than we are currently experiencing. I see these as reflections of trends of atomization of societies in which people are grappling to find a foothold and understand where they fit in. And the way people perceive and process information now is greatly altered from the way when I was growing up, you know. We had TV and a couple of newspapers, or like three channels on TV; now it's an overwhelming amount of information and is being strangely targeted through algorithms that most people don't understand and is being pushed to people to reinforce their predilections, which is not a healthy thing to do. One of the things we look at in the field of the prevention of violent extremism, or countering violent extremism, is to focus on critical thinking skills so that students gain the ability to determine the veracity or the reliability of the information that they are processing and being fed. That is a society-wide effort. And then it doesn't help that we have social media platforms that tailor the information in a certain way. I think that there is now a vigorous and healthy debate on these issues and how to ameliorate their worst tendencies. I know in the case of the United States, several years ago, there was what seemed to be a momentum towards regulation in Congress about social media. Places in other parts of the world, the European Union in particular, have taken that on and tried to strike the right balance between human rights and freedom of expression issues on the one hand, and security issues on the other. But I do not think it is a clash of civilizations, but I do think, in addition to what I mentioned, that it is the ability of very clever actors, for example ISIL or Da'esh, using social media and other information technologies to identify those seams in society and rip them right open and accelerate them, and use them for recruitment and other purposes.

QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: 1

Dr. Gregorian, thank you very much for your presentation. My question is, how the Women, Peace and Security agenda could be applied to this situation with women and children in Afghanistan under present circumstances?

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN

Well, in general terms, the United Nations has been outspoken on the issue of the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan. You can expect us to continue to be staunch supporters of that. Our ability to undertake certain kinds of activities in Afghanistan is limited at present and is focused in the first instance on humanitarian assistance. But in that respect, women and girls' access to education is very high on the agenda and will continue to be so. But I think as we come to grips with the implications of the Taliban takeover, in particular their interim government that they've announced, we also need to pay careful attention to the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the countries around Afghanistan—to perhaps double down on efforts in those countries, if you will. But also, it is more broadly, we here [in UNOCT] are making sure that all of our programming has gender considerations mainstreamed into it along with human rights. But at the moment, as you can imagine, we can't do business with a regime of which almost half its members are sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. So, our ability to do anything inside Afghanistan is limited, but we should focus our resources and efforts on the surrounding area.

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER

Ambassador Eizenstat, can you, perhaps, make a comment related to the role of the value system, particularly democracy? Can we try to develop a strategy to combine educational efforts of the role religion plays in this problem and the role of the media and civil society? What role can they play in this strategy?

AMBASSADOR (RET.) STUART EIZENSTAT

Well first Yonah, let me say that we need to be very humble about our capacity to impose our system in different societies. We must understand that those societies are not necessarily built with the institutions that we have to make democracy work. It does not mean at all that we withdraw from trying to build institutional capacity, but trying to impose our system on others can be very difficult. So our political goals need to be very carefully planned to coordinate with our military actions and with the type of country we are dealing with. Iraq for example was a central functioning state, as awful as it was, but

Afghanistan was very decentralized and different. With respect to the role of social media we must cooperate more closely with Facebook and others in terms of flagging and blocking terrorist sites. We have to have much more monitoring with our own agencies on the chatter that occurs with terrorist recruitment, which will be enhanced by our withdrawal from Afghanistan. But again, I think our boarded lesson is that military action does have a role when others like diplomacy, sanctions, and trade don't do the job. But it should be applied with a scalpel and not a hammer and should be applied when we think through the consequence politically and are geared towards the nature of the country its culture and its language. And I would say Richard with you here, I was a political appointee in the Biden administration. I have enormous respect for the career of foreign service members. I worked in every agency in the government directly or indirectly. No one has that capability, but we do not put enough emphasis on building up our capacity in these countries. We send young foreign services officers from one part of the world to another, with language training in northern Virginia in between. This is a poor system. We need to have foreign service officers people who are willing to focus full time on these areas of conflict, and train them, along with our military and intelligence community, in the language, the culture, the politics, and history of conflict zones.

QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: 2

Who do we have to fight in the future to weaken or wipeout terrorism at large? The sponsors as the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan or terrorist groups created by the mentioned sponsors?

AMBASSADOR (RET.) STUART EIZENSTAT

Well, we have to do all of the above. We have to be willing to try and build up the countries that can repositories, we have to take firmer action against Iran that are direct supporters. We never figured out how to deal with Pakistan, so we have to have a multifaceted effort whether the country is a direct sponsor or whether it's the host the level at which it's supporting, which might be the case in Afghanistan. It may be that the Taliban for all of its sort of pre-2001 members of the cabinet may try to have a functioning state but simply won't have the capacity to keep terrorists from using it as ground central. So, we have to have very different strategies depending on the type of country we are dealing with.

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN

Thank you, Professor Colwell, for your presentation on anthrax. I'm curious, it was just about twenty years ago when U.S. forces went into Afghanistan, and we discovered a lot of things that al-Qaeda was up to. One of them was that they had their own bio-weapons research facility. How serious of a threat do you think that was? And as you mentioned, it's been twenty years since the anthrax scare- are we better prepared internationally and in the U.S. to handle a threat that would come from that kind of agent?

PROFESSOR RITA COLWELL

Firstly, I knew a member of the team that investigated the Al-Qaeda anthrax threat. The laboratories were relatively primitive and the evidence indicated a poor capability to produce large amounts of Anthrax agent. The individual in charge of the laboratory had been brought in from another country. While there was capacity to initiate production of anthrax, it was not a major threat based on capacity to deliver.

Today we would be able to identify the agent, which we were not able to do twenty years ago. Today we can identify practically within a few hours, if not minutes. We are able to do genomics and bioinformatics, as witnessed from the Covid-19 virus. The sequence was internationally available with weeks and when the sequence was known, tracking the virus was possible.

With respect to anthrax, it remains a potential threat. We do not have public health laboratories within each state with the capacity to serve local communities we used to have. When I was a graduate student, the State Public Health laboratories provided comprehensive advice and assistance. The Nation needs to rebuild the State Public Health Laboratory System in the United States from future public health engineers.

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN

Mr. Prosen, how has NATO adapted in recent years to counter terrorism? You know NATO has talked about addressing terrorism for a number of years, but what is it actually doing on counterterrorism issues, if anything?

HON. RICHARD PROSEN

Thanks for the question, Raffi. NATO has had a military strategy since 9/11. But during the first Obama Administration it leveraged this strategy to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism policy framework, which was subsequently used as the basis for the establishment of NATO's Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (CTAP). The CTAP was first adopted at the end of the Obama Administration and updated again at the beginning of the Trump Administration. The CTAP took NATO's policy guidelines and offered a set of lines of effort in eight different categories with approximately forty discrete action items.

NATO has made great progress on enhancing information-sharing, promoting the development of counterterrorism capabilities, raising awareness, developing capacity-building and training efforts, and enhancing public diplomacy efforts. It has focused on addressing terrorism as an international threat, including through support of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq and offering significant contributions to the Defeat-ISIS campaign. In short, there are a lot of things that NATO has done to fight terrorism. But we'd like to see it do more. In fact, we are in the process of finalizing an award to NATO to conduct multiagency battlefield evidence training for NATO partner nations. This is an effort to ensure NATO has additional resources to complement the counterterrorism efforts NATO undertakes with common funding to build counterterrorism capacity, while encouraging other NATO Allies to similarly provide NATO the resources – financial or in-kind – needed to meet its commitments in fully implementing the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan. We are encouraging NATO to partner with INTERPOL in developing and implementing a “whole-of-government” approach to fighting terrorism, which is a priority area for us over the next few years.

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN

Ambassador Eizenstat, you gave a compelling example of sanctions, or financial action, bringing Iran to the table for what led to JCPOA. How effective in your experience have been sanctions on non-state actor groups, or terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIL? Are we actually freezing large amounts, or meaningful amounts, or money by this pretty robust international structure of FATF and CFT training in which the UN is also involved? I would be interested in seeing your experience.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) STUART EIZENSTAT

To answer, our capacity to actually freeze funds for terrorist groups is much more limited than it is for state actors. So, for example, we have frozen about, I think, seven to nine billion dollars of funds in the Federal Reserve that would not be available to the Taliban unless they come up to certain standards we create. We can block IMF funding as well. But for actual non-state actors, they often use, for example, in Iran and elsewhere the hawalah method of transferring funds. Crypto-currency is difficult to track in an effective way, to really block their funding sources. So a lot of the funding sources do come indirectly from states. We know, for example, that ISI in Pakistan was providing support to the Taliban for years—almost from the time we thought we had wiped them out. So our capacity to actually get at funds of terrorist groups per se is limited, but our ability to track that money back to state actors has improved.

VI. CLOSING REMARKS

GENERAL (RET.) ALFRED GRAY

29th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (1987-1991); Chairman of the Board of Directors and Regents,
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Terrorism is a tactic. It's been used by many different countries throughout history. It's something people do when they don't have anything else or in the case of larger, effective powers, when seeking plausible deniability. The question is, is it really correct to declare war on a tactic? More importantly, there has to be a clear strategy in each country, internationally, for large and small countries. We can do that through the UN, the EU, and other facilities that help coordinate matters internationally. All strategies must be adaptive. We seem to forget that from time to time we need to adapt, modify, or change our strategy, so I would encourage that kind of thought. Some countries that will use terrorist type of activities like for example, the Beirut bombing of our Marine Headquarters in 1983 that was conducted by Hezbollah and Iran. However, there was a lot of money involved and that came through Damascus and the explosives that were used were the latest fuel-enhanced Soviet explosives. That's what did the job and it was the largest non-nuclear explosion we'd ever had. The only other truck bomb was in Afghanistan in 1972 with a pickup truck. The point is that this was a major operation involving large countries and a lot of money. When we started out after 911, there were a lot of programs throughout the country. Here at Potomac Institute, we played a big role in developing the command center in New York City so that it was much more flexible, and there was work done all around the country. With the former Secretary of Navy Richard Danson, largely through his efforts they've formed an anti-terrorist organization within the Marine Corps. That was a national activity, and those activities were further conducted by each state at one point in time.

We used to play war games on this topic. When you play the "what if" war game, the principals have to play. The principals in industry, the principals of government, and principals everywhere. So, we were doing a lot of that. We were actually paying a lot more attention to the global terrorist challenge than we are today. One thing that we did very effectively in commerce and other departments of the government, was to follow the money. That's very important. You need to know where the money's going and learn to follow that. So, I think we've got to go back to some of these techniques and begin to really play this "what if" game, as a nation. Our people ought to be trained on anti-terrorist type activities, techniques, and so on from the ground up.

Of course, we should take our counterterrorism capability, which is pretty good. And by the way, I personally believe the intelligence community has been superb throughout this whole thing. It's quite common to criticize our intelligence community, but I'm not from that breed. I happen to believe that they have done a lot of things very well, but we need to reemphasize the whole terrorist situation and become much more involved again like we were after 911.

AMBASSADOR STUART EIZENSTAT

I do want to add one thing if I could regarding the money. When I was deputy secretary of the treasury in the Clinton administration, we helped develop an international effort that became known as "anti-money laundering" and "know your customer" and so forth, but it was also aimed at terrorist financing. Then my successor did a very good job heading a formal position created under the Deputy Secretary for the Treasury for counter-terrorism financing. So, our banks and financial institutions are much more alert to being used as transfer agents for terrorist financing than they have been before.

GENERAL (RET.) ALFRED GRAY

We've come a long way from our first counter terrorist activities in the military when the big challenge was aircraft. Aircraft being captured by others, and so on. But, when you look back historically at our counter terrorist activities and consider what we've done and what we've learned, it's a tremendous amount. Much of it is very technical, but we've done some awfully good work. It would be timely to go back and review those activities to learn what we can do today to be more prepared. For example, if we have an issue with a grid in New England, an introduction of some kind of nuclear device in New York City, and perhaps a biological problem, the potential for panic in America would be incredible if we're not careful. So, we need to go back and we need to play this game a little bit. We need to play the "what if" game and we need to get people more involved in protecting our great nation.

VII. ABOUT THE EDITORS

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER is the Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies (at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies) and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (at the International Law Institute). He is a former Professor and Director of Terrorism Studies at the State University of New York and the George Washington University. Professor Alexander also held academic appointments elsewhere such as American, Catholic, Chicago, Columbia, and Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has published over 100 books and founded five international journals. His personal collections are housed at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University.

PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR., Yale University BA, Harvard University, LLB, is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University as well as Chairman of the International Law Institute. He is a US delegate to UNCITRAL, vice president of the UNIDROIT Foundation, a member of the American Law Institute, and the former chairman of the International Law Section at the American Bar Association. He is also the author and co-author of several books and articles.

VIII. ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

DR. JENNIFER BUSS earned her B.S. in Biochemistry with a minor in Mathematics from the University of Delaware, and a Ph.D. in Biochemistry from the University of Maryland. She has served as Assistant Vice President, Vice President, then in 2018, was promoted to President of the Potomac Institute. Since joining the Institute as Senior Fellow in 2012, Dr. Buss has written and won numerous proposals, created several new centers and is in charge of all day-to-day business and operating functions of the Institute.

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN brings to the United Nations over 33 years of academic, diplomatic and military experience in counterterrorism and international peace and security. Until September 2019, when he was appointed Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), he was Director of Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of Counterterrorism of the United States Department of State. Dr. Gregorian initiated the first new U.S. peacekeeping policy in 25 years, led a number of important peacekeeping reforms, and helped secure full funding for the UN peacekeeping budget. Dr. Gregorian's field experience includes leading two multinational missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as well as military service in both BiH and in Kosovo. Dr. Gregorian holds a Doctorate in International Relations and Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a Masters of Arts in War Studies from King's College London, and a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History from the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of several academic publications.

GENERAL (RET.) WESLEY CLARK retired as a four star general after 38 years in the United States Army, having served in his last assignments as Commander of US Southern Command and then as Commander of US European Command/ Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He graduated first in his class at West Point and completed degrees in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford University (B.A. and M.A.) as a Rhodes scholar. While serving in Vietnam, he commanded an infantry company in combat. He later commanded the battalion, brigade and division level, and served in a number of significant staff positions, including service as the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). In his final assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe he led NATO forces to victory in Operation Allied Force, a 78-day air campaign, backed by ground invasion planning and a diplomatic process, saving 1.5 million Albanians from ethnic cleansing. His awards include the Presidential Medal of Freedom, Defense Distinguished Service Medal (five awards), Silver star, bronze star, purple heart, honorary knighthoods from the British and Dutch governments, and numerous other awards from other governments. A best-selling author, General Clark has written four books and is a frequent contributor on TV and to newspapers.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) STUART EIZENSTAT is a partner at Covington and Burling LLP, where he heads the firm's international practice. In October 2020, President Trump appointed him Expert Advisor on Holocaust Issues at the U.S. Department of State. During a decade and a half of public service in three US administrations, Ambassador Eizenstat held a number of key senior positions, including chief White House domestic policy adviser to President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and U.S. Ambassador to the European Union. Much of the interest in providing belated justice for victims of the Holocaust and other victims of Nazi tyranny during World War II was the result of his leadership as Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State on Holocaust-Era Issues. Ambassador Eizenstat has received seven honorary doctorate degrees from universities and academic institutions. He has been awarded high civilian awards from the governments of France (Legion of Honor), Germany, and Austria. He is a Phi Beta Kappa, cum laude graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and of Harvard Law School.

HON. RICHARD PROSEN is the Deputy Director of the Office of Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. During his time in the Bureau of Europe and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. Prosen covered transnational threats (including terrorism, cyber-attacks, cross-border illicit trafficking, organized crime, WMD proliferation, etc.), Central Asia/Afghanistan as well as NATO/OSCE resource-related (budget/personnel/finance) matters for the Office of European Security, Political, and Military

Affairs (EUR/RPM). Prior to joining EUR/RPM, Mr. Prosen was posted to the U.S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Political Officer responsible for all U.S. law enforcement engagement and assistance programs, helping Bosnian authorities build sustainable criminal justice institutions. Mr. Prosen also worked in the aerospace industry and served as an officer in the United States Air Force, helping design, integrate, launch, and operate the nation's most technologically sophisticated reconnaissance and missile defense satellite systems. He has an undergraduate degree in Aerospace Engineering (University of Notre Dame) and graduate degrees in International Security Affairs (Australia National University) and Business Administration (Loyola Marymount University).

PROFESSOR RITA COLWELL is a pioneering microbiologist and the first woman to lead the National Science Foundation. She is a Distinguished University Professor at both the University of Maryland and Johns Hopkins University's Bloomberg School of Public Health and has received awards from the Emperor of Japan, the King of Sweden, the Prime Minister of Singapore, and the President of the United States. Her interests are focused on global infectious diseases, water issues, including safe drinking water for both the developed and developing world. She is a nationally recognized scientist and educator, and has authored or co-authored 16 books and more than 700 scientific publications. She produced the award-winning film, *Invisible Seas*, and has served on editorial boards of numerous scientific journals. She is the author of the highly acclaimed book *A Lab of One's Own* (Simon & Schuster).

GENERAL (RET.) ALFRED GRAY USMC (Ret.) serves as Chairman of the Board of the Potomac Institute of Policy Studies (PIPS). In addition to participating in monthly seminars related to the global terrorism challenge, he oversees the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO), which operates as a futuristic think tank for the Marine Corps at Quantico. General Gray has served as Board Chairman and CEO for several public and private companies and has consulted to United States and international industry and government. General Gray's other duties have included service on the Defense Science Board; the Defense Special Operations Advisory Group; the National Security Agency Science Advisory Board; the National Reconnaissance Office Gold Team; the Defense Operations Support Office Advisory Team; and as Director of the Advanced Concept Demonstration Technology for Combat in the Littorals. In 1991, Al Gray retired after 41 years of service to the United States Marine Corps. From 1987-1991, General Gray served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, and was advisor to both Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Among his awards are two Defense Distinguished Service Medals, two Navy Distinguished Service Medals, Distinguished Service Medals from the US Army, the US Air Force and the US Coast Guard, the Silver Star Medal, two Legion of Merits with Combat "V", four Bronze Star Medals with Combat "V", three Purple Hearts, three Joint Commendation Medals, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm and Star, as well as foreign awards from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Korea and The Netherlands. In 2008, General Gray was inducted into the National Security Agency Hall of Honor for rendering distinguished service to American Cryptology.

